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Abstract 
This paper assesses the transmission of ECB monetary policies, conventional and 
unconventional, to both interest rates and lending volumes or bond issuance for three types 
of different economic agents through five different markets: sovereign bonds at 6-month, 5-
year and 10-year horizons, loans to non-financial corporations, and housing loans to 
households, during the financial crisis, and for the four largest economies of the Euro Area. 
We look at three different unconventional tools: excess liquidity, longer-term refinancing 
operations and securities held for monetary policy purposes following the decomposition of 
the ECB’s Weekly Financial Statements. We first identify series of ECB policy shocks at the 
Euro Area aggregate level by removing the systematic component of each series and 
controlling for announcement effects. We second include these exogenous shocks in country-
specific structural VAR, in which we control for the credit demand side. The main result is 
that only the pass-through from the ECB rate to interest rates has been effective. 
Unconventional policies have had uneven effects and primarily on interest rates. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper aims at establishing the effect of a fine decomposition of conventional and 
unconventional ECB monetary policies on both interest rates and volumes in the four largest 
economies of the Eurozone during the global financial crisis. This issue is topical since Mario 
Draghi, chairman of the ECB, justified the implementation of some of the unconventional 
policy tool – the Outright Monetary Transactions - by the disruption of the ECB monetary 
policy transmission to the real economy in some Eurozone countries. The question also 
matters theoretically. Unconventional monetary policies should be neutral (apart from 
signalling effects) except if there is some market segmentation over the following two 
dimensions: along the term structure (short and long term maturities are not perfect 
substitute as there are duration preferences) or between countries (there is a home bias in 
debt holding or risk aversion to some country specific loans or debts). This is the irrelevance 
result of Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) in perfect financial markets. However, there has 
been strong empirical evidence against this neutrality in the most recent literature. 
 
One of the pioneering studies about the monetary transmission mechanism is Bernanke and 
Blinder (1992) showing that the pass-through from the policy rate to lending and deposit 
interest rates is expected to be positive, whereas the pass-through to lending and deposits 
volumes is expected to be negative. Before the recent financial crisis, many studies have 
focused on the monetary transmission mechanism in the Eurozone. Donnay and Degryse 
(2001) with a SVAR, De Bondt (2005) with a vector error-correction model, Sorensen and 
Werner (2006) with a cross-country analysis, Sander and Kleimeier (2006) differentiating 
expected and unexpected monetary policy impulses, assess the pass-through from the policy 
rate to money market rates or bank interest rates. The literature on the bank lending channel 
is less numerous than the one on the interest rate channel; Chatelain et al. (2003) and De 
Santis and Surico (2013) show that bank characteristics play a role in the effect of monetary 
policy on bank lending.  
 
Many articles have studied the effect of conventional monetary policy in the Eurozone 
during the worldwide financial crisis. Andries and Lecarpentier-Moyal (2012), Blot and 
Labondance (2013), Belke, Beckmann and Verheyen (2012), Aristei and Gallo (2012), 
Gigineishvili (2011), Reziti and Spiliotis (2010), Karagiannis, Panagopoulos and Vlamis 
(2010), von Borstel, Eickmeier and Krippner (2015) focus on the interest rate channel. 
However, during the financial crisis, implementing monetary policy became much more 
complex as the transmission mechanism has been severely impaired by disruptions in the 
financial markets; as a consequence, the ECB resorted to unconventional measures to provide 
additional stimulus to the economy. A large literature assesses the effectiveness of such 
measures1. Cordemans and Sola Perea (2011), Abbassi and Linzert (2011), Lenza, Pill and 
Reichlin (2010), Altavilla, Giannone and Lenza (2014), Ghysels, Idier, Manganelli and 
Vergote (2014) and Szczerbowicz (2015) focus on the effect of unconventional tools on 
interest rates. Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2011), Giannone, Lenza, Pill and Reichlin 
(2012), Darracq-Paries and Santis (2013), Boeckx, Dossche and Peersman (2014) and Andrade, 
Cahn, Fraisse and Mésonnier (2015) analyse more specifically the bank lending channel. 
Bonnacorsi di Pati and Sette (2012) study the transmission of monetary shocks affecting 
Italian banks’ balance sheets to the volume and cost of credit to non-financial corporations. 
 
                                                 
1 For the US, see Bernanke, Reinhart and Sack (2004)’s indirect evidence or more recently, Fleming, Hrung and 
Keane (2008), Hrung and Seligman (2011), Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), Thornton (2011), 
Stroebel and Taylor (2009), Altavilla and Giannone (2014) among others, as well as Joyce, Lasaosa, Stevens and 
Tong (2011), Joyce (2012) and Butt, Churm, McMahon, Morotz and Schanz (2014) among others for the UK. 
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The literature is much segmented so far: analyses focus either on conventional or 
unconventional measures, either on interest rates or volumes, and either on the money 
market, sovereign bonds or loans to NFC. Two types of estimation strategies have been 
mostly used: event-studies looking at the response to policy announcements, so their implicit 
focus is on the signalling and confidence channel specifically and the high-frequency 
response to these announcements, or VAR analyses with the amounts of liquidities provided 
or securities bought by the monetary authority, so the implicit focus is on the other channels 
and the lower-frequency response to those policies. This paper contributes to this literature 
in three ways. First, we assess at the same time the pass-through to interest rates and 
volumes so as to capture both dimensions of each market. Second, we investigate at the same 
time the effects of both conventional and unconventional monetary policies, the latter being 
decomposed at a fine level. Third, the analysis is performed, over the financial crisis sample, 
for the four largest economies of the Eurozone: Germany, France, Italy and Spain, and at a 
disaggregated level encompassing sovereign bonds at 6-month, 5-year and 10-year horizons, 
loans to non-financial corporations, and housing loans to households. 
 
We proceed in two steps. We first identify series of ECB policy shocks, the main refinancing 
operation interest rate for conventional policy and the amounts spent for each 
unconventional policy as stated in the ECB’s Weekly Financial Statements, at the euro area 
aggregated level. We do so by removing the systematic component of each series and 
therefore stripping out their unpredictable component. Using amounts spent rather than 
announcements suggests that these policies could have been anticipated by market 
participants. However, we show that this is not the case and that our series of shocks are not 
predictable. We focus on amounts spent as we are interested in the real effects of 
unconventional policies, not the high-frequency effects of announcements. To identify 
unconventional monetary shocks exogenous to anticipation effects, we control for the effects 
of policy announcements. In doing so, we focus on the transmission channels other than the 
signalling and confidence channels, and we therefore provide a lower bound estimate of the 
effects of these policies. Second, we include these 4 estimated series of interest rate and 
unconventional policy shocks in country-specific structural VARs with 5 additional 
endogenous variables, namely industrial production, inflation, a proxy variable to control for 
the credit demand (or bond issuance), interest rates and volumes for each of the five markets 
considered, as well as oil prices, a composite indicator of systemic stress (CISS) and the Euro 
Stoxx 50 index as exogenous variables.  
 
The main result is that only the pass-through from the ECB rate to interest rates has been 
effective, consistently with the existing literature, while the transmission mechanism of the 
ECB rate to volumes has been weak. Unconventional policies have had uneven effects. It 
gives support to the break-up of unconventional policies between excess liquidity, LTRO and 
SHMPP. Excess liquidity has an effect on interest rates in Germany and Spain, and on 
volumes in France and Spain. In comparison, the impacts of LTRO measures are weaker and 
concentrated exclusively on interest rates. In contrast, SHMPP measures which were targeted 
towards peripheral countries have been effective at modifying interest rates in these 
countries and, to a lower extent, volumes.   
 
One argument to explain the differentiated pass-through of ECB monetary policies lies on 
the complementarity of these ECB policies. As stated by Mario Draghi, the objective of 
unconventional policies may have been to restore the transmission mechanism of the 
conventional policy. So as to shed light on this issue, we look at the effect of conventional 
policy shocks on unconventional policy tools and vice-versa. A shock to the conventional 
tool of monetary policy has no effect on any unconventional policies. Regarding the effect of 
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shocks to unconventional tools on the ECB interest rates, there are only a few instances 
where the former complements the latter, with excess liquidity and SMHPP policies. 
 
Another argument is that the successful pass-through from the ECB rate to interest rates, 
which materialized as a decrease in interest rates during the sample period, had a negative 
effect on the supply side of loans, and offset itself its positive effects on lending volumes. The 
interest rate channel may be a substitute to the bank lending channel on the supply side 
when net interest margins deteriorate, and ever more so for larger banks which retain market 
power. Landier, Sraer and Thesmar (2013) show that a 100 basis point decrease in the Fed 
funds rate leads a US bank at the 75th percentile of the income gap distribution to decrease 
lending by about 1.6 percentage point annually relative to a bank at the 25th percentile.  
 
In a context where commercial banks attempt to increase their capital ratios while 
governments try to reduce their debts, a policy implication of this result would be for central 
banks to target more directly non-financial corporations or households when implementing 
unconventional monetary policy or to constrain more effectively bank lending to ensure an 
operative pass-through towards the real economy. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework, 
section 3 data, section 4 the identification of policy shocks and section 5 the empirical 
strategy and results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Framework 
 
This paper is at the crossroads of two evolutions in monetary policy: the first, theoretical, 
relates to the introduction of financial frictions; and, the second relates to central bank 
practices and their unconventional measures. These evolutions raise the issue of the 
transmission channels of monetary policy. Under the classical view of the transmission 
channel, interest rates impact economic activity by affecting relative prices in the economy 
(relative prices of capital, of future consumption in terms of current consumption and of 
domestic goods in terms of foreign goods); this constitutes the interest rate channel and 
encompasses most mechanisms that are not associated with financial frictions. The interest 
rate channel is economically significant because of the link between changes in short nominal 
rates and long real interest rates.2 
 
To the extent that consumer and investment spending, and in the first place, durable/capital 
goods expenditure depend on long rather than short rates, the expectations theory of the 
term structure holds, so that short rate movements are transmitted to long rates. 
Nevertheless, many features of the configuration of interest rates during the financial crisis 
are puzzling from the perspective of the expectations hypothesis.3 Furthermore, term premia 
have affected the extent to which changes in short rates are translated into further changes 
along the yield curve by responding systematically to offset movements in short rates, which 
is expected to weaken the effect of policy changes. Interest rate channels, due to market 
segmentation, may well differ in size from one market to another. As regards the 
conventional instrument of monetary policy, we thus expect a larger transmission 
mechanism on short-horizon markets than at a longer horizon.   
 
                                                 
2 Provided that the central bank affects real interest rates, the impact of monetary policy depends on the interest 
rate sensitivity of aggregate demand and supply, which may explain the decline of the monetary pass-through 
during the recent financial crisis. 
3 See Gürkaynak and Wright (2012). 
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The introduction of imperfect information in monetary policy theory has given rise to a 
credit view which has stressed a distinct role to financial assets and liabilities. For instance, 
the bank lending channel explains the effects of monetary policy with movements in the 
supply of bank credit. The essential feature is that the central bank can affect credit supply 
by financial intermediaries by altering base money, which affects the banks’ balance sheet. 
The monetary policy transmission through this channel may be incomplete thanks to limited 
liability, credit rationing, or the imperfect substitutability between retail deposits and 
wholesale deposits or debt on the liability side of banks’ balance sheets. Bernanke and 
Blinder (1988) assume fixed costs of direct financial market participation and banks’ 
incomplete/imperfect information in the market for equity and corporate debt. They show 
that such structures amplify the effects of monetary policy shocks. However, this 
amplification will depend on the size of the lending contraction for a given shock: the more 
interest inelastic is the demand for money, the lower will be this contraction. Consequently, 
the bank lending channel not only emerges on the equilibrium price of the market – the 
interest rate set on this market – but also on the volumes, provided one control for the 
demand for bank credit.  
 
The implementation of unconventional monetary policies hinges on new channels (see Joyce 
et al., 2011, for a survey): portfolio balance, policy signaling, and default channels. These 
policies can also help improve the bank lending channel and a complementarity may emerge 
between conventional and unconventional policies. 
 
After a change in the volume or structure of central bank balance sheet, transmission 
channels of unconventional policies will be operating provided financial frictions are 
included. Without financial frictions, the composition of central bank assets is irrelevant in 
the same sense as in the Modigliani-Miller theorem on the structure of corporate liabilities 
(Wallace, 1981). Curdia and Woodford (2011) and Gertler and Karadi (2011) propose 
extensions of DSGE models to quantitative easing measures taken by a central bank under 
disruptive financial markets or intermediaries. They show that credit policy can improve 
welfare provided financial disruption is sufficiently high (Curdia and Woodford) or 
provided an agency problem is introduced between financial intermediaries and depositors 
(Gertler and Karadi).  
 
Unconventional measures take different forms; consequently, they have different impacts on 
markets. The purchase of large amounts of debt instruments like QE is expected to impact 
directly on the sovereign debt market, or on a segment of it, e.g. the market related to the 
maturity involved in policy measures4. We expect that QE policy will produce a reduction in 
the interest rate and/or an increase in the volume of the sovereign debt market or on the 
segment targeted by the central banker. We also expect some spillovers on other markets or 
other segments of the same market, via portfolio changes or confidence effects. Fixed-rate 
full-allotment operations which gave rise to excess liquidity are targeted towards the money 
market. Their impact is expected to be small and potentially negative on other markets: 
excess liquidity is mainly driven by the refinancing needs of banks, either because of low 
deposits inflows or because of unsecured short run liabilities (ECB Monthly Bulletin, January 
2014). Long-term refinancing operations (LTRO) initially fuel excess liquidity. We do not 
expect a large impact on financial markets, on the volumes and, consequently, on interest 
rates. The announcement of Targeted LTRO by the ECB in June 2014, which aims explicitly at 
improving bank lending, gives weight to our expectation of a low impact of LTRO, although 
some impact of 2011 and 2012 LTRO on sovereign bonds markets could emerge.  
                                                 
4 OMT measures (not operational yet) involve the purchase of public bonds up to 3-year maturity.  
 6 
 
Table 1 – Expected effects of positive monetary policy shocks 5 
 Conventional 
policy 
Unconventional 
policies 
Interest rates + - 
Volumes - + 
 
Although the multiplicity of unconventional measures requires a differentiated study of their 
respective effects, we will also investigate their aggregate effects. Table 1 summarizes the 
theoretical predictions of conventional and (undifferentiated) unconventional policies on 
credit volumes and interest rates. 
 
3. Data 
 
This paper focuses on the monetary transmission mechanism since the global financial crisis 
in four countries: France, Germany, Italy and Spain. Our dataset goes from June 2007 to 
October 2014 with a monthly frequency so comprises 89 observations. The monetary 
transmission mechanism is assessed for conventional and non-conventional tools and on five 
markets: sovereign debt at three maturities, loans to non-financial corporations (NFC), and 
housing loans to households.6 
 
Conventional monetary policy is measured with the ECB rate for main refinancing 
operations, whose data over the period is available from the ECB database. We use the ECB’s 
weekly financial statements (WFS)7 to obtain a fine decomposition of all unconventional 
policy measures. We have already discussed in section 2.1 about the differentiated objectives 
of unconventional measures; for this reason, we aim at analysing precisely their effects on 
interest rates and volumes. Focusing on one type of measure only would not give full credit 
to the set of measures that the ECB has implemented during the crisis. The simplest 
unconventional tool is excess liquidity (current accounts – reserve requirements + deposit 
facility – marginal lending facility, or in WFS terms: item 2.1 – res. req. + item 2.2 – item 5.5). 
The second set of unconventional tools is Longer-term Refinancing Operations (in WFS 
terms: item 5.2). The most unconventional instrument is the amount of securities held for 
monetary purposes, including the Securities Market Program, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Covered 
Bond Purchase Programs, and the most recent Asset-Backed Securities Purchase Program (in 
WFS terms: item 7.1). These data series are taken from the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse, 
and are expressed in percentage of Euro area (changing composition) GDP. Figure 1 plots the 
4 variables. It highlights the differences in the timing and size of measures which require an 
individual treatment.  
 
For each country (France, Germany, Italy and Spain), the endogenous variables needed for 
estimating the monetary transmission mechanism include the specific interest rates and their 
corresponding volumes.  
 
The monetary transmission mechanism is first assessed in the sovereign debt market. Data 
availability in auctions results has limited the number of countries to only four. Data for new 
issuances were found on national debt agencies’ websites (Agence France Trésor, Banco de 
España, Banca d’Italia, Deutsche Finanzagentur). After compiling all auctions, we have 
                                                 
5 A positive conventional monetary policy shock corresponds to an increase in the policy rate, while a positive 
unconventional monetary policy shock corresponds to an expansion of the central bank balance sheet.  
6 See appendix for data descriptions and descriptive statistics. 
7 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/wfs/2015/html/index.en.html 
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chosen allotments and corresponding yields for bonds with 6-month, 5-year and 10-year 
maturity. Indeed, these maturities seem to be the most representative of monthly auction 
amounts8. For each country, bonds from 165-day to 210-day maturity are chosen as a proxy 
for 6-month maturity bonds, bonds from 54-month to 72-month maturity for 5-year maturity 
bonds and bonds from 114-month to 132-month maturity for 10-year maturity bonds; thus, 
we escape the problem of disregarding close-to-reference maturity issuances (5 months and 
27 days instead of 6 months for example). The allotments are expressed in percentage of euro 
area GDP. 
 
For the market of loans to NFC, we take the ‘new business’ volumes and their corresponding 
annual interest rates, with ‘new business’ volumes expressed as a percentage of Euro area 
GDP. These data were available over the period on national central bank’s databases 
(Banque de France, Banca d’Italia, Bundesbank) or Datastream for Spain. 
 
The lending market to households is usually decomposed between housing loans and cash 
loans. In each country, cash loans represent a relatively small portion of all loans to 
households and they are traded at a legal interest rate ceiling which has substantially less 
variance than interest rates on housing loans9. For both reasons, we decided to focus on 
housing loans whose interest rates vary with policy rates. For each country, we take the ‘new 
business’ volume of housing loans and their corresponding annual interest rates. New 
business volumes are expressed as a percentage of Euro area GDP. These data were available 
over the period on national central bank’s databases (Banque de France, Banca d’Italia) or 
Datastream for Spain and Germany. 
 
So far, we depicted monetary channels of transmission on the five markets as if their 
respective volumes were expressed in gross terms or as if they were only supply-driven. 
Empirical outcomes will be partial, unless we correct the supply of bonds and credit for 
exogenous determinants or demand-driven factors. New public debt gross issuance does not 
only respond to a new policy environment (policy rate, GDP change, etc.) but it also stems 
from former commitments, like debt redemption. Thus, we use debt redemption as a proxy 
of the lower bound of refinancing needs of government, to net out new issuances of gross 
debt. Consequently, the estimated monetary channels on sovereign markets are based on a 
proxy of new issuances of net debt. As regards credit to NFC and households, we use BLS 
surveys to net out credit supply of some drivers of credit demand. Here again, the estimated 
monetary channels are based on proxies of a net supply of credit.  
 
A set of macroeconomic variables is used for the two stages of the analysis, first the 
identification of common monetary policy shocks and, second, the estimation of country-
specific and market-specific monetary channels of transmission. This dataset comprises euro 
area aggregate data and national data. At the aggregate level, oil prices, the unemployment 
rate, the CISS, the Euro Stoxx 50, the 10-year euro area average sovereign bond interest rate, 
private credit growth and the euro/dollar exchange rate are taken from the ECB Statistical 
Data Warehouse. Oil prices, CISS and Euro Stoxx 50 indices are the same variable for all 
countries and correspond to Brent crude oil price in euro, expressed in month over month 
                                                 
8 Together, they represent 25% of the French sovereign debt (9% for 6-month maturity bonds, 8% for 5-year 
maturity bonds and 8% for 10-year bonds), 32% of the Spanish one (2% for 6-month, 14% for 5-year, 16% for 10-
year), 49% of the Italian one (26% for 6-month, 12% for 5-year and 11% for 10-year), 58% of Germany’s (21% for 6-
month, 17% for 5-year and 20% for 10-year). 
9 In each country, cash loans represent 30% of all loans to households on average over the sample. The variance of 
interest rates on housing loans is 9 times higher than the variance of interest rates of cash loans in Germany, 3 
times higher in Italy, 30% higher in France and 18% higher in Spain. 
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percentage change, to the Composite Indicator for Systemic Stress, capturing financial 
instability, and to the stock price index for the major 50 European firms. At the national level, 
for each country, the consumer price index is available on ECB Statistical Data Warehouse, 
and the volume of industrial production, used as a proxy for domestic output, is available on 
Eurostat. Both are expressed in year over year percentage change. We add the stock price 
index for their major firms: CAC40 for France, DAX for Germany, FTSE MIB for Italy and 
IBEX35 for Spain. All these are available on ECB Statistical Data Warehouse or Euronext 
website. Table A in the Appendix provides some descriptive statistics for all variables. 
 
4. Identifying ECB policy shocks 
 
Before estimating country-specific and market-specific structural VARs, we identify for each 
instrument at the euro area aggregated level ECB policy shocks orthogonal to a wide array of 
macroeconomic variables. We aim at removing the systematic component underlying the 
evolution of the four policy instruments so as to retain their unpredictable part. The rationale 
for this identification is twofold. First, it aims at avoiding endogeneity and, second, it is 
consistent with the ECB deciding and executing its policies at the aggregate Euro area level.  
 
Our identification of shocks focuses on the actual implementation of monetary policies, 
although one may argue that the shock happens at the time of the announcement and that 
most of its effect is therefore realised on the announcement of the policy. However, focusing 
on announcements with event-studies10 only measures the signalling and confidence 
channels on very short time windows. These effects might be offset over the following days. 
In addition, it does not tell what the actual effects of the policy are, and it only informs about 
the credibility of the monetary authority. Ultimately, if the effect comes directly on the 
announcement, this goes against our hypothesis and our identification captures the lower 
bound of the effect of monetary policies. The fact that our shocks may be anticipated because 
of the announcements creates another issue. To cope with it, we first control for the 
systematic responses of monetary policies to announcements and second we assess that our 
series of shocks are not predictable. 
Assuming that the systematic dynamics of Yt = {ECB rate, EL, LTRO, SHMPP} is driven by 
policymakers’ responses to data in their information set Ωt, where f(·) is a function capturing 
their systematic reaction, and that the term ߝ௧௒ reflects unexpected shocks to the four 
variables, the model extracting the exogenous shocks can be represented as: 
 
Yt = f(Ωt) + ߝ௧௒  (1) 
 
This equation can be viewed as the reaction function of central bankers, so that in its simplest 
Taylor-rule form, the information set would only comprise inflation and output, proxied by 
industrial production. We augment the set of variables that policymakers are likely to focus 
on with oil prices, the unemployment rate, the CISS, the Euro Stoxx 50, the 10-year euro area 
average sovereign bond interest rate, private credit growth, and the euro/dollar exchange 
rate. For each of the 4 policy instruments, we also augment the information set with the 
remaining 3 policy instruments, making each of the 4 shocks orthogonal to the other policy 
instruments.11 The estimated equation for the ECB rate is given in equation (2) whereas the 
                                                 
10 Alternatives include Instrumental Variables, but there is no obvious relevant instrument to our knowledge or 
usual VAR sign-restrictions, but they need strong theoretical priors, while our stance here is to let the data speak. 
11 Note that the shocks are not purely independent by construction. However, except shocks to EL and LTRO, 
they are actually not statistically correlated. 
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equations for EL, LTRO and SHMPP are of a similar form except that they are augmented 
with dummies for unconventional policy announcements: 
 
݅௧ ൌ 	ߙ ൅	ߚ௜݅௧ିଵ ൅	∑ ߚ௑,௞ܺ௧ି௞ଷ௞ୀ଴ ൅	∑ ߚ௓,௣ܯ௧ି௣ ൅	∑ ߚெ,௝ ௧ܲି௝ଵ௝ୀ଴ଵ௣ୀ଴ ൅ ߝ௧௜   (2) 
 
where Xt includes inflation and output, Mt the additional macro variables listed above, and 
Pt the 3 remaining policy instruments. In contrast with conventional policy actions which are 
not announced in advance, unconventional policies are first announced and then 
implemented in the following months. We introduce dummies to control for the effects of 
unconventional policy announcements and so identify unconventional monetary shocks 
exogenous to anticipation effects. The estimation sample period starts in March 2006 to 
obtain residuals on the sample period studied: June 2007 - October 2014. Table B in the 
appendix reports the output of the estimation of equation (2) for the four policy instruments. 
The contribution of the systematic response to the variables in vectors X, M and P explains 
99.7, 98.9, 98.2 and 99.8% of the variance of the ECB rate, excess liquidity, LTROs and 
SHMPP respectively. The unexplained components, the ߝ௧௒		residuals (plotted in Figure 2), 
are considered as the aggregate policy shocks implemented by the ECB. We introduce them 
in the country-specific structural VARs, which in turn enable us to derive ECB policy shocks 
that are also exogenous to country-specific and market-specific macroeconomic 
developments. 
 
Properties of our series of shocks makes the identification approach relevant: residuals are 
not auto correlated (Table C displays outcomes of the Cumby-Huizinga test), they are 
unpredictable from macro data over the last 3 or 6 months (Table D shows p-values of a F-
test), they have a zero mean and are not correlated together except excess liquidity and 
LTRO shocks (Table E provides descriptive statistics and correlations of the estimated shock 
series)12.  
 
5. The Effects of Conventional and Unconventional Monetary Policies 
 
5.1. A Structural VAR Model 
 
A structural VAR model is used to decompose the aggregate ECB policy shocks into country-
specific and market-specific mutually orthogonal components with a structural economic 
interpretation. We augment a standard VAR for monetary policy analysis including 
industrial production (IP), inflation (CPI), and (shock to) the conventional policy instrument 
with the three other aggregate ECB policy shocks, a proxy for bond issuance/credit demand 
as discussed in section 3 (mc_d), new loans’ interest rates (mc_r) and volumes (mc_v) for each 
market (m) and country (c). We also include as exogenous contemporaneous variables in the 
estimation oil prices, the CISS and domestic stock market indices in the vector Ft. For each 
market, let Zt = [IPt, CPIt, mc_dt, mc_vt, mc_rt, tSHMPP, tLTRO, tEL, tECBrate]’ represent the (9 x 1) 
vector that contains the endogenous variables at date t: 
 
ܣܼ௧ ൌ ܽ ൅ ܤ∑ ܼ௧ି௞ଷ௞ୀ଴ ൅ ܥܨ௧ ൅ ܦܧ௧  (3) 
 
where bij in the B matrix are (k x 1) vectors, F is the vector comprising the three exogenous 
contemporaneous variables, C their associated parameters, and: 
 
                                                 
12 EL and LTRO share similar objectives. 
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ܣ ൌ ܫଽ  (4)      and      ܤ ൌ
ۏ
ێێ
ێێ
ێێ
ێێ
ۍܾଵଵ ܾଵଶ ܾଵଷܾଶଵ ܾଶଶ ܾଶଷ
ܾଷଵ ܾଷଶ ܾଷଷ
ܾଵସ ܾଵହ ܾଵ଺
ܾଶସ ܾଶହ ܾଶ଺
ܾଷସ ܾଷହ ܾଷ଺
ܾଵ଻ ܾଵ଼ ܾଵଽ
ܾଶ଻ ܾଶ଼ ܾଶଽ
ܾଷ଻ ܾଷ଼ ܾଷଽ
ܾସଵ ܾସଶ ܾସଷ
ܾହଵ ܾହଶ ܾହଷ
ܾ଺ଵ ܾ଺ଶ ܾ଺ଷ
ܾସସ ܾସହ ࢈૝૟
ܾହସ ܾହହ ࢈૞૟
ܾ଺ସ ܾ଺ହ ܾ଺଺
࢈૝ૠ ࢈૝ૡ ࢈૝ૢ
࢈૞ૠ ࢈૞ૡ ࢈૞ૢ
ܾ଺଻ ܾ଺଼ ࢈૟ૢ
ܾ଻ଵ ܾ଻ଶ ܾ଻ଷ
଼ܾଵ ଼ܾଶ ଼ܾଷ
ܾଽଵ ܾଽଶ ܾଽଷ
ܾ଻ସ ܾ଻ହ ܾ଻଺
଼ܾସ ଼ܾହ ଼ܾ଺
ܾଽସ ܾଽହ ࢈ૢ૟
ܾ଻଻ ܾ଻଼ ࢈ૠૢ
଼ܾ଻ ଼଼ܾ ࢈ૡૢ
࢈ૢૠ ࢈ૢૡ ܾଽଽ ے
ۑۑ
ۑۑ
ۑۑ
ۑۑ
ې
  (5)  
 
The reduced-form errors Et = [etIP, etCPI, etmc_d, etmc_v, etmc_r, etSHMPP, etLTRO, etEL, etECBrate]’ 
combine the structural innovation to a given variable with the contemporaneous responses 
to the other variables. The recursive identification assumption postulates that the structural 
errors are independent, and that reduced-form errors are related to structural errors through 
a lower triangular D matrix. This means that the covariance between the reduced-form errors 
is attributed to the structural error of the variable ordered previously in Zt, and that the 
structural error is uncorrelated to the reduced-form errors of the preceding variables. This 
recursive identification therefore depends on the ordering of the variables in the Zt vector.  
 
In our benchmark VAR, we assume that shifts in industrial production and inflation produce 
a contemporaneous change in policy variables and in market prices and volumes. The latter 
two also react contemporaneously to policy variables, while by construction policy variables 
react to innovations to market prices and volumes only with a lag. This is consistent with the 
institutional framework and decision-making constraints which, at a monthly frequency, 
introduce delays in the monetary reaction to changes on financial and loans markets. 
Concerning the relative position of the policy variables, we assume that the unconventional 
interventions react with a lag to the ECB interest rate consistently with the prevalence of the 
conventional instrument over unconventional ones.  
 
The structural VAR analysis is performed with k = 3 lags, and with a small sample estimator 
because the number of observations is small. The variance-covariance matrix is estimated 
with a small-sample degrees-of-freedom adjustment: the small-sample divisor used is 1/(T-
m) instead of the maximum likelihood divisor 1/T, where T is the sample size and m the 
average number of parameters in each of the equations. All the eigenvalues lie inside the unit 
circle, so our VAR model satisfies the stability condition to interpret impulse–response 
functions. 
 
Figure 2 confronts ECB aggregate policy shocks, as discussed in section 4, with an alternative 
identification approach of country- and market-specific ECB policy shocks. The latter stem 
from the estimation of the model described in equation (3) where ܼ̅t = [IPt, CPIt, mc_dt, 
mc_vt, mc_rt, SHMPPt, LTROt, ELt, ECBratet]’ substitutes for vector Zt. The differences 
among the country- and market-specific ECB policy shocks are substantial; they show that 
this alternative identification approach is not suitable to an investigation into the country- 
and market-specific channels of transmission of a common monetary policy shock. Moreover, 
the differences between, on the one hand aggregate and, on the other hand, country- and 
market-specific policy shocks show that the former identification approach gives unique 
outcomes; it gives support to the choice of identifying aggregate policy shocks as in section 4. 
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5.2. Impulse Response Functions 
 
Figure 3 plots the impulse responses of interest rates to a one-S.D. innovation (a 0.08 
percentage point increase) in the ECB interest rate, for Germany, France, Italy and Spain 
(rows) and for sovereign bonds at 6-month, 5-year and 10-year horizons, loans to NFC, and 
housing loans to households (columns). The pass-through from the ECB interest rate to 
market rates is significant and positive as expected for all countries on the markets for loans 
to NFC and loans to households, though it is a bit less significant on the latter than on the 
former type of market. The impacts on the NFC markets last 6 months in Germany, France 
and Italy and a bit longer in Spain. The length of impact is also close to 6 months on the 
market for housing loans, except in France where it last beyond 12 months. In contrast with 
the former markets, the pass-through on sovereign-debt markets is less significant and an 
opposition between Northern and Southern countries of the Euro area emerges: there is no 
pass-through in Germany and France, whereas it is positive and significant in Italy, at the 3 
different maturities, and in Spain, temporarily at the 6-month maturity.  Figure 4 plots the 
impulse responses of volumes to a one-S.D. innovation in the ECB interest rate. We would 
expect volumes to be negatively correlated to an increase in the ECB interest rate but we 
obtain mixed results. First, there is very scarce and temporary evidence of a pass-through. 
Debt at 10-year horizon in Germany, debt at 6-month horizon in Italy and NFC and housing 
loans in Spain show short-lived evidence. Second, the pass-through is very low, except for 
NFC loans in Spain where the elasticity is close to 2. Third, there are also unexpected positive 
impacts, in Italy and France.  
 
Figure 5 presents the impulse responses of interest rates to a one-S.D. innovation (a 0.16 
percentage point increase in terms of Euro Area GDP) in excess liquidity. There is evidence 
of a pass-through from unconventional policies to interest rates over our sample in Germany 
on the market for housing loans and in Spain on the market for NFC loans. Both last more 
than 6 months. In Italy, there is no such pass-through. In France, one can interpret the 
(statistically weak) positive response of interest rates on sovereign bonds at 10-year horizon 
as a portfolio balance effect. Excess liquidity would induce demand for high-yield bonds. 
Figure 6, which plots the impulse responses of volumes to a one-S.D. innovation in excess 
liquidity, shows that French public debt at 10-year horizon reacts positively and temporarily 
to the shock on EL. In Germany and Italy, there is no evidence of a pass-through from EL to 
volumes. In contrast, Spain shows evidence of a relatively strong pass-through for NFC 
loans, with a maximum elasticity above unity. 
 
Among the four countries studied, Spain once again emerges as the most beneficial one of 
LTRO measures, but only in terms of market rates. Figure 7 presents the impulse responses 
of interest rates to a one-S.D. innovation (a 0.32 percentage point increase in terms of Euro 
Area GDP) in LTROs. The impact on the market for NFC loans in Spain is significant, 
negative and lasting 6 months. The same impact is weaker in Germany, where evidence also 
points to temporary and significant rises in interest rates, on the 10-year bond market and on 
the market for housing loans. In France and Italy, there is no pass-through from LTRO on 
interest rates. Figure 8 plots the impulse responses of volumes to a one-S.D. innovation in 
LTROs, and does not show any evidence of a pass-through. LTRO measures thus have had 
only limited impact in the Euro area. 
 
Figure 9 presents the impulse responses of interest rates to a one-S.D. innovation (a 0.04 
percentage point increase in terms of Euro Area GDP) in SHMPP. The shock introduces a 
discrepancy in impact between, on the one hand, Germany and France, and on the other 
hand, Italy and Spain. In the former countries, we find a statistically weak but positive 
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impact of SHMPP on interest rates, for sovereign bonds at 6-month horizon and NFC loans 
in Germany, and for sovereign bonds at 5 and 10-year horizon in France. In the latter 
countries, IRFs show evidence of statistically significant negative impacts on sovereign bond 
markets, at 6-month and 5-year horizon in Italy and 6-month and 10-year horizon in Spain. 
This discrepancy in impact can be interpreted as reflecting the discrepancy in context: 
peripheral countries, like Spain or Italy, have been hit by the sovereign debt crisis, with 
growing spreads vis-à-vis the German Bund, whereas core countries, like Germany and 
France, have to some extent benefited from the crisis via their role of safe havens, evidenced 
by a negative trend in their bond yields. Evidence about the impact of the same policy on 
volumes is weaker than the impact on interest rates. Figure 10 plots the impulse responses of 
volumes to a one-S.D. innovation in SHMPP. In Italy and Spain, there is some evidence of an 
increase in volumes on sovereign bond markets, but it is very short and weakly significant. 
In both countries, weak evidence also points to a different reaction of the housing loans 
markets: loans increase in Italy and decrease in Spain. In Germany, SHMPP has a short 
negative impact on volumes on public debt at 6-month horizon whereas in France, the 
sovereign bond market at 5-year horizon reacts positively in the short run.  
 
In summary, IRFs show that the conventional interest rate channel has been at work in the 4 
countries, but conventional monetary policy has only had a weak effect on volumes. IRFs for 
unconventional policies show that they have had quite different effects. It gives support to 
the break-up of unconventional policies between excess liquidity, LTRO and SHMPP. Excess 
liquidity has had a pass-through on interest rates in Germany and Spain, and on volumes in 
France and Spain. In comparison, the impacts of LTRO measures have been weaker and 
concentrated exclusively on interest rates. In contrast, SHMPP measures which were targeted 
towards peripheral countries have been effective at modifying interest rates in these 
countries and, to a lower extent, volumes.  
 
In the following, we discuss about the relevance of our identification approach and of main 
results. First, we discuss about the introduction of sign restrictions and, second, about 
restrictions on the linkages between conventional and unconventional policies. Third, we 
show results stemming from a unique monetary policy stance, mixing the conventional and 
the 3 unconventional measures. 
 
5.3. Isolating the direct effect of policy variables on rates and volumes 
 
The structural VAR model already introduces short-run restrictions, with the Cholesky 
decomposition in the D matrix of equation (3), but it does not introduce sign restrictions.  
Sign restrictions in VAR estimations of monetary policy channels of transmission have been 
common in the literature since Faust (1998). For instance, Uhlig (2005) argues that sign 
restrictions help reconsider the impact of monetary policy shocks on output. Although Faust 
(1998) imposes sign restrictions on impact, Uhlig (2005) extends sign restrictions to several 
periods after the monetary shock and concludes that monetary shocks in the US have no 
clear-cut impact on output. The relevance of sign restrictions can be assessed by the estimates 
of the direct effect of policy variables on market rates and volumes from equation (3). They 
consist in the country- and market-specific estimated coefficients b46-b49 (impacts of policy 
variables on volumes) and b56-b59 (impacts of policy variables on interest rates) in the B 
matrix. By construction, interest rates and volumes cannot respond on impact (i.e. 
contemporaneously) to shocks to the policy variables since they are ordered before in the Z 
vector. 
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Results are reported in Table 2. They show that the sum of coefficients is in most cases not 
significantly different from zero. Consequently, the introduction of sign restrictions in the 
structural VAR discussed in this paper would not fit the data. The evaluation of the 
reliability of sign restrictions thus supports the choice of not introducing such restrictions. 
 
5.4. Isolating the cross-effects of policy variables 
 
The empirical literature has pointed out that unconventional monetary policy measures may 
impact directly on conventional policy (see, e.g. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 
2011). The introduction of some restrictions in the direct relationships between different 
types of monetary policy must be discussed. The reliability of such restrictions can be 
assessed via the country- and market-specific estimated coefficients b69-b89 (impacts of ECB 
rate on unconventional policy variables) and b96-b98 (impacts of unconventional policy 
variables on ECB rate) in the B matrix of equation (3). 
 
Results reported in Table 3 show a very clear picture. A shock to the conventional tool of 
monetary policy has no statistically significant impact on unconventional policies, whatever 
the latter is, whatever the market and whatever the country. Regarding the direct effect of 
shocks to unconventional tools on the ECB interest rates, there are only a few instances 
where the former complements the latter, 2 related to excess liquidity, 5 related to SMHPP 
and none related to LTRO.  
 
5.5. Squaring the preceding results with a unique policy stance variable 
 
Although our results point to different outcomes across the different monetary policy 
instruments, a simpler model in which all instruments are summarised into a single one is 
worth investigating. If this model gives similar results overall – an effective interest rate 
channel and an impact of ECB monetary policy on some specific market’s volumes - it will 
weaken the approach of this paper to deal with a detailed description of ECB monetary 
policies.  
 
The new environment of monetary policy, with the growing importance of unconventional 
measures because of the zero-lower bond on the conventional instrument, has urged 
research on the assessment of the overall monetary stance and led to the computations of 
“shadow rates” as single measure of conventional and unconventional policies.  Wu and Xia 
(forthcoming) have used their shadow rate to gauge the macroeconomic effects of US 
monetary policies during the crisis. We first identify shocks to their shadow rate for the Euro 
area using the same method as for the previous policy measures, so estimating equation (2) 
without the P vector. Second we measure the impact of ECB monetary policy on the 20 
markets under study. Estimates stem from equation (3) in which the shadow rate substitutes 
for the 4 policy variables, so the model is a 5-equation VAR. 
 
Results reported in Figures 11 and 12 show that contrary to our former results, the interest 
rate channel vanishes. The only exception is the market for loans to NFC in Spain. As for the 
impact of ECB monetary policy on volumes, most impulse responses are not statistically 
significant. When they are, they give counter-intuitive outcomes: volumes increase 
(temporarily) in Germany (NFC loans) and Italy (5-year sovereign bonds and NFC loans). 
We check that these outcomes are not sensitive to an identification approach without sign 
restrictions. Results reported in table 4 show that the shadow rate has no direct impact (at the 
1% level) either on interest rates or on volumes in all markets studied. Sign restrictions 
would not fit the data. 
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In summary, the use of an overall stance of ECB monetary policy does not give the same 
results as with detailed stances of monetary policies, which we interpret as a support 
towards the approach we follow. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper aims at establishing the effect of a fine decomposition of conventional and 
unconventional ECB monetary policies on both interest rates and volumes in the four largest 
economies of the Eurozone during the global financial crisis. We first identify series of ECB 
policy shocks, the main refinancing operation interest rate for conventional policy and on 
amounts spent for each unconventional policy as stated in the ECB’s Weekly Financial 
Statements, at the euro area aggregated level, by removing the systematic component of each 
series. Second, we include these four estimated series of interest rate and unconventional 
policy shocks in country-specific structural VARs with five macro variables. 
 
The pass-through from the ECB rate to interest rates has been effective, consistently with the 
existing literature, whereas the transmission mechanism of the ECB rate to volumes has been 
weak. Unconventional policies have had uneven effects. It gives support to the break-up of 
unconventional policies between excess liquidity, LTRO and SHMPP. Excess liquidity has an 
effect on interest rates in Germany and Spain, and on volumes in France and Spain. In 
comparison, the impacts of LTRO measures are weaker and concentrated exclusively on 
interest rates. In contrast, SHMPP measures which were targeted towards peripheral 
countries have been effective at modifying interest rates in these countries and, to a lower 
extent, volumes.   
 
This paper focuses on the effects of ECB monetary policies on low-frequency interest rates 
and volumes. Further research may be directed towards a cross investigation of higher-
frequency event-studies allowing to capture the confidence and signalling channels with 
lower-frequency analysis allowing to capture the channels of transmission to macro 
variables. It would permit to estimate in a single framework both the effects of monetary 
policy actions and announcements.  
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Figure 1: ECB policy instrument time series 
 
 
 
 
Note: The ECB rate is expressed in % while the three unconventional tools are expressed in percentage of EA 
GDP. 
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Figure 2: Euro Area aggregate policy shocks and country- and market-specific shocks 
 
 
 
 
Note: Thick lines plot the Euro Area aggregate policy shocks estimated in section 4 while thin lines 
plot the country- and market-specific shocks estimated with equation (4) but including ECB and 
unconventional variables in the vector of endogenous variables ܼ̅t in section 5.1. Since the analysis is 
performed for 4 countries and 5 markets, there are 20 series of country- and market-specific shocks 
plotted. 
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Figure 3: Response of interest rates to a positive ECB interest rate shock 
in Germany (1st row), France (2nd), Italy (3rd) & Spain (4th) 
 
GB_6m GB_5y GB_10y NFC HH 
 
The impulse response corresponds to the percentage point change in interest rates, in response to a one-S.D. innovation in the ECB interest rate, together with 1 and 2 S.E. 
confidence band intervals. 
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Figure 4: Response of volumes to a positive ECB interest rate shock 
in Germany (1st row), France (2nd), Italy (3rd) & Spain (4th) 
 
GB_6m GB_5y GB_10y NFC HH 
 
The impulse response corresponds to the percentage point change in interest rates, in response to a one-S.D. innovation in the ECB interest rate, together with 1 and 2 S.E. 
confidence band intervals. 
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Figure 5: Response of interest rates to a positive Excess Liquidity shock 
in Germany (1st row), France (2nd), Italy (3rd) & Spain (4th) 
 
GB_6m GB_5y GB_10y NFC HH 
 
The impulse response corresponds to the percentage point change in interest rates, in response to a one-S.D. innovation in the ECB interest rate, together with 1 and 2 S.E. 
confidence band intervals. 
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Figure 6: Response of volumes to a positive Excess Liquidity shock 
in Germany (1st row), France (2nd), Italy (3rd) & Spain (4th) 
 
GB_6m GB_5y GB_10y NFC HH 
 
The impulse response corresponds to the percentage point change in interest rates, in response to a one-S.D. innovation in the ECB interest rate, together with 1 and 2 S.E. 
confidence band intervals. 
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Figure 7: Response of interest rates to a positive LTRO shock 
in Germany (1st row), France (2nd), Italy (3rd) & Spain (4th) 
 
GB_6m GB_5y GB_10y NFC HH 
 
The impulse response corresponds to the percentage point change in interest rates, in response to a one-S.D. innovation in the ECB interest rate, together with 1 and 2 S.E. 
confidence band intervals. 
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Figure 8: Response of volumes to a positive LTRO shock 
in Germany (1st row), France (2nd), Italy (3rd) & Spain (4th) 
 
GB_6m GB_5y GB_10y NFC HH 
 
The impulse response corresponds to the percentage point change in interest rates, in response to a one-S.D. innovation in the ECB interest rate, together with 1 and 2 S.E. 
confidence band intervals. 
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Figure 9: Response of interest rates to a positive SHMPP shock 
in Germany (1st row), France (2nd), Italy (3rd) & Spain (4th) 
 
GB_6m GB_5y GB_10y NFC HH 
 
The impulse response corresponds to the percentage point change in interest rates, in response to a one-S.D. innovation in the ECB interest rate, together with 1 and 2 S.E. 
confidence band intervals. 
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Figure 10: Response of volumes to a positive SHMPP shock 
in Germany (1st row), France (2nd), Italy (3rd) & Spain (4th) 
 
GB_6m GB_5y GB_10y NFC HH 
 
The impulse response corresponds to the percentage point change in interest rates, in response to a one-S.D. innovation in the ECB interest rate, together with 1 and 2 S.E. 
confidence band intervals.  
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Figure 11: Response of interest rates to a positive shadow rate shock 
in Germany (1st row), France (2nd), Italy (3rd) & Spain (4th) 
 
GB_6m GB_5y GB_10y NFC HH 
 
The impulse response corresponds to the percentage point change in interest rates, in response to a one-S.D. innovation in the ECB interest rate, together with 1 and 2 S.E. 
confidence band intervals.  
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Figure 12: Response of volumes to a positive shadow rate shock 
in Germany (1st row), France (2nd), Italy (3rd) & Spain (4th) 
 
GB_6m GB_5y GB_10y NFC HH 
 
The impulse response corresponds to the percentage point change in interest rates, in response to a one-S.D. innovation in the ECB interest rate, together with 1 and 2 S.E. 
confidence band intervals. 
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model param se model param se model param se model param se
g_gb_6m -0.72 [0.41] g_gb_6m -0.18 [0.24] g_gb_6m -0.14 [0.16] g_gb_6m 1.49** [0.74]
g_gb_5y -0.76 [1.09] g_gb_5y -0.60 [0.63] g_gb_5y -0.19 [0.43] g_gb_5y 0.05 [1.95]
g_gb_10y -0.20 [0.96] g_gb_10y -0.47 [0.54] g_gb_10y 0.42 [0.39] g_gb_10y -0.66 [1.71]
g_nfc 0.74 [0.38] g_nfc 0.01 [0.21] g_nfc -0.21 [0.14] g_nfc 2.05*** [0.64]
g_hh 0.89 [0.82] g_hh -1.41*** [0.49] g_hh -0.52 [0.32] g_hh 0.65 [1.43]
f_gb_6m -0.41 [0.49] f_gb_6m 0.24 [0.27] f_gb_6m -0.08 [0.19] f_gb_6m 0.91 [0.82]
f_gb_5y -0.49 [0.83] f_gb_5y -0.74 [0.49] f_gb_5y -0.74** [0.35] f_gb_5y 1.27 [1.47]
f_gb_10y -0.39 [0.62] f_gb_10y 0.10 [0.39] f_gb_10y 0.13 [0.27] f_gb_10y 0.54 [1.17]
f_nfc 1.13*** [0.34] f_nfc 0.21 [0.21] f_nfc 0.04 [0.14] f_nfc 1.04 [0.56]
f_hh 0.16 [0.09] f_hh -0.07 [0.05] f_hh -0.04 [0.04] f_hh 0.08 [0.16]
i_gb_6m 1.33 [1.38] i_gb_6m 0.02 [0.80] i_gb_6m -0.52 [0.52] i_gb_6m -3.66 [2.31]
i_gb_5y 0.93 [1.34] i_gb_5y 0.99 [0.82] i_gb_5y 0.15 [0.52] i_gb_5y -1.79 [2.41]
i_gb_10y 1.01 [1.25] i_gb_10y 0.73 [0.73] i_gb_10y 0.25 [0.50] i_gb_10y 0.18 [2.18]
i_nfc 0.44 [0.46] i_nfc 0.01 [0.25] i_nfc -0.18 [0.16] i_nfc 0.58 [0.73]
i_hh 0.34 [0.24] i_hh -0.16 [0.14] i_hh -0.05 [0.09] i_hh 0.26 [0.47]
s_gb_6m 1.96** [0.98] s_gb_6m 0.77 [0.57] s_gb_6m -0.45 [0.39] s_gb_6m -1.46 [1.75]
s_gb_5y 1.07 [0.83] s_gb_5y 0.92 [0.54] s_gb_5y -0.09 [0.36] s_gb_5y -1.06 [1.46]
s_gb_10y 0.26 [0.69] s_gb_10y 0.72 [0.44] s_gb_10y -0.12 [0.29] s_gb_10y -0.91 [1.31]
s_nfc 2.19*** [0.64] s_nfc 0.12 [0.31] s_nfc -0.37 [0.20] s_nfc 0.67 [0.91]
s_hh 0.33 [0.29] s_hh -0.02 [0.16] s_hh -0.01 [0.10] s_hh 0.66 [0.46]
model param se model param se model param se model param se
g_gb_6m 0.04 [0.03] g_gb_6m 0.00 [0.01] g_gb_6m 0.00 [0.01] g_gb_6m -0.03 [0.05]
g_gb_5y 0.06 [0.05] g_gb_5y 0.04 [0.03] g_gb_5y 0.01 [0.02] g_gb_5y 0.06 [0.09]
g_gb_10y 0.00 [0.05] g_gb_10y 0.04 [0.03] g_gb_10y 0.03 [0.02] g_gb_10y -0.03 [0.09]
g_nfc 0.58 [1.30] g_nfc 0.22 [0.72] g_nfc 0.34 [0.48] g_nfc -2.10 [2.16]
g_hh -0.03 [0.03] g_hh -0.02 [0.02] g_hh -0.02 [0.01] g_hh -0.02 [0.05]
f_gb_6m -0.02 [0.05] f_gb_6m 0.02 [0.03] f_gb_6m 0.02 [0.02] f_gb_6m -0.03 [0.09]
f_gb_5y -0.01 [0.05] f_gb_5y -0.02 [0.03] f_gb_5y -0.03 [0.02] f_gb_5y 0.24** [0.09]
f_gb_10y 0.03 [0.06] f_gb_10y 0.06 [0.03] f_gb_10y 0.02 [0.02] f_gb_10y 0.23** [0.10]
f_nfc -1.33 [1.67] f_nfc 0.17 [0.99] f_nfc 0.67 [0.67] f_nfc 0.21 [2.71]
f_hh 0.07** [0.04] f_hh 0.00 [0.02] f_hh -0.01 [0.02] f_hh -0.01 [0.06]
i_gb_6m -0.05 [0.07] i_gb_6m -0.02 [0.04] i_gb_6m 0.02 [0.03] i_gb_6m 0.01 [0.12]
i_gb_5y 0.03 [0.08] i_gb_5y -0.01 [0.05] i_gb_5y 0.00 [0.03] i_gb_5y 0.15 [0.15]
i_gb_10y -0.01 [0.04] i_gb_10y -0.02 [0.02] i_gb_10y -0.02 [0.02] i_gb_10y 0.06 [0.07]
i_nfc 3.35 [1.96] i_nfc -0.73 [1.06] i_nfc -1.02 [0.68] i_nfc 0.14 [3.08]
i_hh 0.02 [0.03] i_hh -0.02 [0.02] i_hh -0.01 [0.01] i_hh 0.09 [0.06]
s_gb_6m 0.01 [0.01] s_gb_6m 0.00 [0.01] s_gb_6m 0.00 [0.00] s_gb_6m 0.02 [0.02]
s_gb_5y -0.09 [0.06] s_gb_5y -0.06 [0.04] s_gb_5y 0.01 [0.02] s_gb_5y -0.03 [0.10]
s_gb_10y -0.06 [0.06] s_gb_10y -0.02 [0.04] s_gb_10y 0.00 [0.03] s_gb_10y 0.12 [0.12]
s_nfc -0.53 [1.96] s_nfc 0.78 [0.94] s_nfc 0.89 [0.61] s_nfc -0.16 [2.79]
s_hh 0.02 [0.04] s_hh -0.01 [0.02] s_hh -0.02 [0.02] s_hh -0.08 [0.07]
Notes:  Estimated from equation (3). ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 2 - Estimates of the direct effect of policy variables on rates and volumes
Effect on interest rates
Effect on volumes
ECB rate - b59 EL - b58 LTRO - b57 SHMPP - b56
ECB rate - b49 EL - b48 LTRO - b47 SHMPP - b46
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model param se model param se model param se
g_gb_6m -0.15 [0.12] g_gb_6m -0.17** [0.08] g_gb_6m 0.42 [0.36]
g_gb_5y -0.15 [0.12] g_gb_5y -0.18** [0.08] g_gb_5y 0.31 [0.37]
g_gb_10y -0.22** [0.11] g_gb_10y -0.14 [0.08] g_gb_10y 0.03 [0.35]
g_nfc -0.14 [0.12] g_nfc -0.11 [0.08] g_nfc 0.20 [0.38]
g_hh -0.17 [0.14] g_hh -0.13 [0.09] g_hh 0.03 [0.40]
f_gb_6m -0.06 [0.12] f_gb_6m -0.09 [0.08] f_gb_6m 0.30 [0.35]
f_gb_5y -0.21 [0.12] f_gb_5y -0.18** [0.08] f_gb_5y -0.02 [0.35]
f_gb_10y -0.21 [0.13] f_gb_10y -0.16 [0.09] f_gb_10y 0.01 [0.38]
f_nfc 0.00 [0.12] f_nfc -0.09 [0.08] f_nfc 0.04 [0.33]
f_hh -0.26** [0.13] f_hh -0.23** [0.09] f_hh 0.35 [0.38]
i_gb_6m -0.16 [0.12] i_gb_6m -0.10 [0.08] i_gb_6m 0.16 [0.35]
i_gb_5y -0.13 [0.13] i_gb_5y -0.11 [0.08] i_gb_5y 0.13 [0.38]
i_gb_10y -0.14 [0.12] i_gb_10y -0.13 [0.08] i_gb_10y 0.22 [0.35]
i_nfc -0.14 [0.13] i_nfc -0.08 [0.08] i_nfc -0.27 [0.37]
i_hh -0.17 [0.13] i_hh -0.15 [0.09] i_hh -0.20 [0.43]
s_gb_6m -0.17 [0.13] s_gb_6m -0.17* [0.09] s_gb_6m 0.12 [0.39]
s_gb_5y -0.14 [0.14] s_gb_5y -0.13 [0.09] s_gb_5y -0.05 [0.38]
s_gb_10y -0.16 [0.13] s_gb_10y -0.12 [0.09] s_gb_10y -0.10 [0.40]
s_nfc -0.19 [0.12] s_nfc -0.21*** [0.08] s_nfc -0.01 [0.36]
s_hh -0.16 [0.13] s_hh -0.14 [0.08] s_hh 0.33 [0.36]
param se param se param se
g_gb_6m -0.82 [0.62] g_gb_6m 0.06 [0.80] g_gb_6m 0.17 [0.11]
g_gb_5y -0.81 [0.63] g_gb_5y 0.59 [0.75] g_gb_5y 0.15 [0.11]
g_gb_10y -0.93 [0.66] g_gb_10y 0.37 [0.87] g_gb_10y 0.20 [0.12]
g_nfc 0.15 [0.64] g_nfc -1.21 [0.87] g_nfc 0.13 [0.12]
g_hh -0.88 [0.67] g_hh 0.54 [0.92] g_hh 0.17 [0.12]
f_gb_6m -0.53 [0.68] f_gb_6m -0.13 [0.89] f_gb_6m 0.15 [0.12]
f_gb_5y -0.36 [0.64] f_gb_5y -0.14 [0.83] f_gb_5y 0.13 [0.10]
f_gb_10y -0.55 [0.62] f_gb_10y 0.10 [0.82] f_gb_10y 0.15 [0.10]
f_nfc -0.21 [0.71] f_nfc -0.41 [0.95] f_nfc 0.15 [0.13]
f_hh 0.05 [0.69] f_hh -0.15 [0.89] f_hh 0.03 [0.12]
i_gb_6m -0.47 [0.64] i_gb_6m -0.16 [0.86] i_gb_6m 0.10 [0.11]
i_gb_5y -0.69 [0.62] i_gb_5y 0.64 [0.84] i_gb_5y 0.08 [0.11]
i_gb_10y -0.40 [0.60] i_gb_10y 0.20 [0.85] i_gb_10y 0.12 [0.11]
i_nfc -0.20 [0.71] i_nfc -0.45 [1.01] i_nfc 0.13 [0.13]
i_hh -0.68 [0.66] i_hh 0.36 [0.90] i_hh 0.14 [0.11]
s_gb_6m -0.26 [0.67] s_gb_6m -0.02 [0.93] s_gb_6m 0.13 [0.12]
s_gb_5y -0.36 [0.64] s_gb_5y 0.06 [0.89] s_gb_5y 0.11 [0.11]
s_gb_10y -0.42 [0.61] s_gb_10y 0.05 [0.87] s_gb_10y 0.13 [0.11]
s_nfc -0.86 [0.76] s_nfc 0.17 [1.08] s_nfc 0.25 [0.14]
s_hh -0.40 [0.68] s_hh -0.34 [0.97] s_hh 0.23 [0.12]
Notes:  Estimated from equation (3). ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
EL - b89 SHMPP - b79 LTRO - b69
Effect of unconventional policy variables on the ECB rate
Table 3 - Estimates of the cross-effects of policy variables
Effect of the ECB rate on unconventional policy variables
EL - b98 SHMPP - b97 LTRO - b96
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model param se model param se
g_gb_6m -0.03 [0.17] g_gb_6m -0.01 [0.01]
g_gb_5y -0.07 [0.37] g_gb_5y 0.00 [0.02]
g_gb_10y 0.06 [0.36] g_gb_10y 0.00 [0.02]
g_nfc 0.12 [0.16] g_nfc 0.78 [0.46]
g_hh 0.47 [0.32] g_hh 0.01 [0.01]
f_gb_6m -0.13 [0.17] f_gb_6m -0.01 [0.02]
f_gb_5y -0.02 [0.30] f_gb_5y 0.00 [0.02]
f_gb_10y -0.05 [0.24] f_gb_10y -0.01 [0.02]
f_nfc 0.07 [0.15] f_nfc -0.36 [0.67]
f_hh 0.07** [0.03] f_hh 0.01 [0.01]
i_gb_6m 0.05 [0.49] i_gb_6m 0.00 [0.02]
i_gb_5y -0.37 [0.48] i_gb_5y 0.06** [0.03]
i_gb_10y -0.34 [0.42] i_gb_10y -0.01 [0.01]
i_nfc 0.11 [0.15] i_nfc 0.92 [0.68]
i_hh -0.01 [0.09] i_hh 0.00 [0.01]
s_gb_6m 0.21 [0.37] s_gb_6m 0.00 [0.00]
s_gb_5y -0.28 [0.30] s_gb_5y 0.00 [0.02]
s_gb_10y -0.26 [0.27] s_gb_10y -0.01 [0.02]
s_nfc 0.53** [0.22] s_nfc -0.60 [0.64]
s_hh 0.09 [0.13] s_hh 0.01 [0.02]
Table 4 - Estimates of the effect of a shadow rate
Notes: Estimated from equation (3) in which the 4 policy
variables are replaced by a shadow rate. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
on interest rates on volumes
 32 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 
 
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
g_gb_6m_r 89 1.03 1.45 -0.09 4.38 g_gb_6m_v 89 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.07
g_gb_5y_r 89 1.80 1.27 0.02 4.69 g_gb_5y_v 89 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.09
g_gb_10y_r 88 2.54 1.11 0.90 4.66 g_gb_10y_v 89 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.08
g_nfc_r 89 3.23 1.22 1.79 5.77 g_nfc_v 89 2.23 3.99 -3.40 11.60
g_hh_h_r 89 4.70 1.12 2.84 6.47 g_hh_h_v 88 0.14 0.01 0.11 0.18
f_gb_6m_r 89 1.13 1.49 -0.01 4.46 f_gb_6m_v 89 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.11
f_gb_5y_r 89 2.19 1.20 0.37 4.91 f_gb_5y_v 89 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.08
f_gb_10y_r 89 3.09 0.92 1.21 4.85 f_gb_10y_v 89 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.09
f_nfc_r 89 3.14 1.13 2.05 5.80 f_nfc_v 89 4.27 5.53 -2.80 16.00
f_hh_h_r 89 3.91 0.67 2.75 5.32 f_hh_h_v 88 0.11 0.03 0.05 0.23
i_gb_6m_r 89 1.79 1.41 0.14 6.50 i_gb_6m_v 89 0.10 0.03 0.00 0.19
i_gb_5y_r 89 3.47 1.22 0.29 6.47 i_gb_5y_v 89 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.27
i_gb_10y_r 89 4.42 0.95 1.66 7.56 i_gb_10y_v 89 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.09
i_nfc_r 89 3.57 1.04 1.93 5.84 i_nfc_v 89 2.21 6.07 -6.30 14.30
i_hh_h_r 89 3.91 1.04 2.51 5.95 i_hh_h_v 88 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.09
s_gb_6m_r 89 1.80 1.35 0.08 4.45 s_gb_6m_v 89 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03
s_gb_5y_r 89 3.61 1.08 0.96 6.18 s_gb_5y_v 89 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.16
s_gb_10y_r 89 4.52 0.95 2.08 6.74 s_gb_10y_v 89 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.15
s_nfc_r 89 3.78 0.98 2.46 5.91 s_nfc_v 89 -0.63 10.74 -14.30 27.60
s_hh_h_r 89 3.61 1.09 2.36 6.07 s_hh_h_v 88 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.16
f_cpi 89 1.64 1.05 -0.80 4.00 f_ip 89 -1.72 6.24 -20.80 7.26
s_cpi 89 1.99 1.64 -1.30 5.30 s_ip 89 -4.09 6.62 -21.71 4.85
i_cpi 89 2.00 1.23 -0.20 4.20 i_ip 89 -3.11 7.97 -25.70 10.41
g_cpi 89 1.70 0.96 -0.70 3.50 g_ip 89 0.90 8.57 -23.65 14.89
rate 95 1.65 1.38 0.05 4.25 op 95 9.15 28.56 -48.89 63.89
el 95 1.99 2.29 -0.15 8.02 unemp 95 9.87 1.64 7.20 12.03
ltro 95 5.42 2.67 1.39 11.17 ciss 95 0.30 0.20 0.03 0.78
shmpp 95 1.28 1.16 0.00 2.90 stoxx 95 0.03 20.28 -45.12 44.96
shadow 95 1.18 1.64 -0.61 4.33 bonds 95 3.69 0.75 1.69 4.81
cpi 95 1.83 1.07 -0.60 4.00 credit 95 3.33 4.38 -2.21 12.12
ip 95 -0.48 6.96 -21.57 9.18 eurodol 95 1.43 9.07 -16.22 17.84
Table A - Descriptive Statistics
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
ECB rate EL LTRO SHMPP
CPI 0.129* -0.03 0.383 0.07
[0.07] [0.27] [0.37] [0.05]
L.CPI -0.029 0.339 -0.533 -0.066
[0.08] [0.26] [0.39] [0.05]
L2.CPI -0.083 -0.148 0.183 0.022
[0.06] [0.22] [0.31] [0.04]
L3.CPI 0.039 0.028 -0.169 -0.047
[0.05] [0.18] [0.27] [0.04]
Ind.Pro. 0.01 -0.005 -0.006 0.007
[0.01] [0.04] [0.05] [0.01]
L.Ind.Pro. -0.007 0.054 -0.009 0.006
[0.01] [0.04] [0.06] [0.01]
L2.Ind.Pro. -0.023** -0.005 -0.062 -0.003
[0.01] [0.04] [0.05] [0.01]
L3.Ind.Pro. 0.01 -0.077** 0.078 -0.007
[0.01] [0.03] [0.05] [0.01]
Oil prices -0.003 0.001 -0.012 -0.001
[0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.00]
L.Oil prices 0.003 0.001 0.007 0
[0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.00]
Unemp. -0.721*** 1.163 -0.557 0.045
[0.26] [1.07] [1.60] [0.19]
L.Unemp. 0.489* -2.776*** 2.405 0.136
[0.28] [0.94] [1.47] [0.20]
CISS 0.006 0.186 0.449 0.215
[0.25] [0.88] [1.35] [0.15]
L.CISS -0.559** -2.114** 2.206* 0.439**
[0.26] [0.90] [1.28] [0.17]
STOXX 0.001 0.003 0.007 -0.001
[0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.00]
L.STOXX -0.001 -0.01 0.014 0.002
[0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.00]
10y gov. rates 0.021 -0.285 0.241 0.073*
[0.06] [0.20] [0.31] [0.04]
L.10y gov. rates -0.002 -0.138 0.286 0.024
[0.07] [0.22] [0.33] [0.04]
Credit 0.063** -0.240** 0.348** 0.01
[0.02] [0.09] [0.14] [0.02]
L.Credit -0.037 -0.004 -0.018 -0.029
[0.03] [0.11] [0.15] [0.02]
Euro/Dollar -0.003 -0.038*** 0.015 0.003
[0.00] [0.01] [0.02] [0.00]
L.Euro/Dollar 0.011** 0.006 0.02 0
[0.00] [0.02] [0.02] [0.00]
ECB rate 0.034 -0.462 0.059
[0.47] [0.70] [0.08]
L.ECB rate 0.718*** -0.126 0.81 0.103
[0.06] [0.41] [0.62] [0.08]
EL 0.005 1.175*** 0.069**
[0.04] [0.13] [0.03]
L.EL 0.025 0.292*** 0.009 0.007
[0.03] [0.11] [0.17] [0.02]
LTRO -0.031 0.477*** -0.038**
[0.02] [0.05] [0.02]
L.LTRO 0.025 0.059 -0.07 -0.01
[0.02] [0.08] [0.12] [0.02]
SHMPP 0.244 0.677 -1.052
[0.18] [0.65] [1.05]
L.SHMPP -0.144 0.438 -0.976 0.769***
[0.17] [0.60] [1.10] [0.08]
Constant 2.490** 15.821*** -19.081*** -2.282***
[1.03] [3.08] [5.63] [0.69]
Announcement dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Nb of obs. 92 92 92 92
R² 0.997 0.989 0.982 0.998
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. L is the
lag operator.
Table B - Identification of shocks
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lag chi2 p-val lag chi2 p-val
1 0.01 0.92 1 3.76 0.05
2 0.72 0.40 2 0.66 0.42
3 0.13 0.72 3 0.39 0.53
lag chi2 p-val lag chi2 p-val
1 2.70 0.10 1 7.69 0.01
2 1.30 0.25 2 2.36 0.12
3 2.64 0.10 3 2.50 0.11
Table C - Cumby-Huizinga test for autocorrelation
Note: H0: disturbance is MA process up to order q, HA: serial correlation
present at specified lags >q.
ECB rate EL
LTRO SHMPP
Variable F-stat p-value F-stat p-value
ECB rate 0.44 0.99 0.51 0.98
EL 0.23 1 0.41 0.99
LTRO 0.27 0.99 0.44 0.99
SHMPP 0.56 0.95 0.69 0.89
3 lags 6 lags
Table D - Predictability of policy shocks
Note: Vector of explanatory variables: CPI, IndPro, Oil,
Unemp, CISS, STOXX, 10yBond rates, Credit, Euro/Dollar.
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
eps_rate 0.00 0.08 -0.20 0.19
eps_el 0.00 0.24 -0.78 0.93
eps_ltro 0.00 0.35 -1.00 1.32
eps_shmpp 0.00 0.05 -0.13 0.14
eps_rate eps_el eps_ltro eps_shmpp
eps_rate 1
eps_el -0.02 1
eps_ltro 0.14 -0.69*** 1
eps_shmpp -0.14 -0.19 0.20 1
Table E - Descriptive statistics and correlations
Note: The eps  variables correspond to the shocks estimated in 
section 4.  *** means that the p-value < 0.01.
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Data description 
 
 
 
BCE ECB interest rate on main refinancing operations Annual Interest Rate ECB Statistical Data Warehouse
CPI
Ov erall inflation in the euro area (changing 
composition)
Index ECB Statistical Data Warehouse
IP
Industrial production for the euro area (18 fix ed 
composition)
Year ov er y ear percentage change ECB Statistical Data Warehouse
UNEMP
Euro area (changing composition) standardised 
unemploy ment rate
Annual Rate ECB Statistical Data Warehouse
BONDS
Euro area (changing composition) 10-y ear 
gov ernment benchmark bond y ield
Yield ECB Statistical Data Warehouse
CREDIT
Stocks of loans and securities, all maturities, all 
amounts, euro area (changing compositon)
As a percentage of euro area GDP ECB Statistical Data Warehouse
GDP
Gross domestic product at market prices, euro area 
(changing composition)
Annual lev el, monthly  frequency ECB Statistical Data Warehouse
SHADOW Shadow  rate for the euro area Annual Rate Wu and Xia (forthcoming)
EL
Ex cess liquidity , computed as current accounts – 
reserv e requirements + deposit facility  – marginal 
lending facility
As a percentage of euro area GDP ECB Statistical Data Warehouse
SHMPP
Securities held for monetary  purposes (Securities 
Market Program, 1st 2d and 3d Cov ered Bond 
Purchase Programs, Asset-Backed Securities 
Purchase Program)
As a percentage of euro area GDP ECB Statistical Data Warehouse
LTRO Longer-term refinancing operations As a percentage of euro area GDP ECB Statistical Data Warehouse
SIZE Size of ECB's balance sheet (total assets / liabilities) As a percentage of euro area GDP ECB Statistical Data Warehouse
EL_i Dummies for ex cess liquidity  announcements Dummy Based on ECB Monthly  Bulletins
LTRO_i
Dummies for longer-term refinancing operations 
announcements
Dummy Based on ECB Monthly  Bulletins
SHMPP_i
Dummies for securities held for monetary  policy  
purposes announcements
Dummy Based on ECB Monthly  Bulletins
EURODOL Euro-dollar ex change rate Monthly  rate FRED Saint Louis
CISS Composite Indicator of Sy stemic Stress Index ECB Statistical Data Warehouse
STOXX
Dow  Jones Euro Stox x  50 Price Index  (Historical 
close, av erage of observ ations through period)
Equity /index ECB Statistical Data Warehouse
OP
Oil price (for commodity , brent crude oil 1 month 
forw ard) - free on board per barrel, in euro
Year ov er y ear percentage change ECB Statistical Data Warehouse
Common variables
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C_GB_6M_R
Weighted av erage y ield of 6-month maturity  bonds 
(from 165 to 210 day s)
Annual Interest Rate
Deutsche Finanzagentur, Agence France 
Trésor, Banca D'Italia, Banco de España 
C_GB_6M_V
Total allotment of 6-month maturity  bonds (from 165 
to 210 day s) ov er the month
As a percentage of euro area GDP
Deutsche Finanzagentur, Agence France 
Trésor, Banca D'Italia, Banco de España 
C_GB_5Y_R
Weighted av erage y ield of 5-y ear maturity  bonds 
(from 54 to 72 months)
Annual Interest Rate
Deutsche Finanzagentur, Agence France 
Trésor, Banca D'Italia, Banco de España 
C_GB_5Y_V
Total allotment of 5-y ear maturity  bonds (from 54 to 
72 months) ov er the month
As a percentage of euro area GDP
Deutsche Finanzagentur, Agence France 
Trésor, Banca D'Italia, Banco de España 
C_GB_10Y_R
Weighted av erage y ield of 10-y ear maturity  bonds 
(114 to 132 months)
Annual Interest Rate
Deutsche Finanzagentur, Agence France 
Trésor, Banca D'Italia, Banco de España 
C_GB_10Y_V
Total allotment of 10-y ear maturity  bonds (from 114 
to 132 months) ov er the month
As a percentage of euro area GDP
Deutsche Finanzagentur, Agence France 
Trésor, Banca D'Italia, Banco de España 
C_GB_DMD
Flow s of redemptions, securities in nominal v alue, 
all currencies combined
Month to month percentage change ECB Statistical Data Warehouse
C_NFC_R
Lending rate to domestic non-financial corporations 
(new  business, index  of notional stocks), all 
maturities, all amounts
Annual Interest Rate ECB Statistical Data Warehouse
C_NFC_V
Loans to domestic non-financial corporations (new  
business, index  of notional stocks), all amounts, all 
maturities
Year ov er y ear percentage change
Bundesbank, Banque de France, Banca 
D'Italia, Datastream
C_NFC_DMD
Diffusion index  of loan demand, enterprise, forw ard 
looking three months
Quarterly  Index , monthly  
frequency
BLS Surv ey
C_HH_H_R
Lending rate to domestic households (new  
business), for housing loans (all maturities, all 
Annual Interest Rate ECB Statistical Data Warehouse
C_HH_H_V
Loans to domestic households (new  business), 
housing loans (all maturities, all amounts)
As a percentage of euro area GDP
Datastream, Banque de France, Banca 
d'Italia
C_HH_DMD
Diffusion index  of loan demand, loans for house 
purchase, forw ard looking three months
Quarterly  Index , monthly  
frequency
BLS Surv ey
C_CPI Consumer Price Index Annual rate of change ECB Statistical Data Warehouse
C_STOXX
DAX (GDAXI), CAC 40, FTSE MIB and IBEX 35 
indices 
Year ov er y ear percentage change Euronex t
C_IP Volume index  of industrial production Year ov er y ear percentage change Eurostat
Country specific variables
C stands for the country : G for Germany, F for France, I for Italy and S for Spain
